Onder 3.7 Gerechtshof Den Haag 17 december 2019

25. The Court notes that the Appeals Board's refusal was based solely on the fact that the applicant had not supported his compensation claim by adducing evidence of his innocence. Although it was founded on section 28(1)(b) of the Law of 13 March 1973, which expressly provides that a person against whom proceedings have been discontinued must establish his innocence by adducing factual evidence or submitting legal argument to that effect, such a requirement, without qualification or reservation, casts doubt on the applicant's innocence. It also allows doubt to attach itself to the correctness of the decisions by the investigating courts, notwithstanding the observation in the Appeals Board's decision that the evidence against the applicant at the time when he appeared before those courts had been judged insufficient to justify committing him for trial. It is true that the voicing of suspicions regarding an accused's innocence is conceivable as long as the conclusion of criminal proceedings has not resulted in a decision on the merits of the accusation (see Sekanina , cited above, pp. 15-16, § 30), and that in Belgian law a discontinuation order does not bar the reopening of a case in the event of new evidence or new developments. However, the burden of proof cannot simply be reversed in compensation proceedings brought following a final decision to discontinue proceedings. Requiring a person to establish his or her innocence, which suggests that the court regards that person as guilty, is unreasonable and discloses an infringement of the presumption of innocence .

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