Onder 2.4.4 Hoge Raad 5 april 2022

121. An analysis of the Court's case-law discloses two possible situations in which the question of a lack of judicial impartiality arises. The first is functional in nature: where the judge's personal conduct is not at all impugned, but where, for instance, the exercise of different functions within the judicial process by the same person (see Piersack, cited above), or hierarchical or other links with another actor in the proceedings (see court martial cases, for example, Grieves, cited above, and Miller and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 45825/99 (https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng), 45826/99 and 45827/99 (https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng), 26 October 2004), objectively justify misgivings as to the impartiality of the tribunal, which thus fails to meet the Convention standard under the objective test (see paragraph 118 above). The second is of a personal character and derives from the conduct of the judges in a given case. In terms of the objective test, such conduct may be sufficient to ground legitimate and objectively justified apprehensions as in Buscemi, cited above, but it may also be of such a nature as to raise an issue under the subjective test (see, for example, Lavents, cited above) and even disclose personal bias. In this context, therefore, whether a case falls to be dealt with under one test or the other, or both, will depend on the particular facts of the contested conduct.”

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