Onder 1.4 Parket bij de Hoge Raad 20 februari 2015

12. Na verweer van Modsaf overweegt het scheidsgerecht (in § 174) dat “ the limitation concept (...) is a matter of procedural law” , dat de ICC-Rules “ clearly provide for the finality ” van vonnissen en dat ook de Nederlandse wet de res judicata, het gezag van gewijsde, kent. Het scheidsgerecht merkt vervolgens op dat geen van de partijen “ appears to object to the finality of the Tribunal’s determination of Issue 4. What they are seeking under Issue 55 is in fact the clarification or the interpretation of the Tribunal’s finding under issue 4, namely what did the Tribunal intend when it rejected the Respondent’s submission that Claimant’s claims were time-barred on the basis of a fixed limitation period. Did it in fact intend a time-bar with extinctive effect or a time-bar of non-extinctive effect? This is perfectly clear from the arguments quoted above from Respondent’s written submission and Counsel ‘s presentation at the Quantum hearing.” In § 176 stelt het scheidsgerecht voorop dat het zich bewust is van de “ finality of its previous finding ” en dat het zonder het issue te heropenen de volgende verduidelijking geeft. Het scheidsgerecht roept overwegingen betreffende het begrip time-barred uit PFA2 in herinnering en overweegt dat geen van die overwegingen “ was made subject to any addition or restriction. In other words, the term “time-bar” throughout the Tribunal’s finding was used in an absolute sense, without qualification or a particular specificity attached to it. ” Het scheidsgerecht concludeert vervolgens (§ 177) dat “ (…) it has already exercised its jurisdiction in respect of the determination of the issues whether any claim or counterclaim asserted in the present arbitration is time-barred for reason of limitation. ”

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