Onder 4.9 Parket bij de Hoge Raad 14 juni 2018

17. In that regard, the Court has emphasised that the term “imposed”, used in the second sentence of Article 7 § 1, cannot be interpreted as excluding from the scope of that provision all measures introduced after the pronouncement of the sentence (Del Río Prada v. Spain [GC], § 88). Consequently, when measures taken by the legislature, the administrative authorities or the courts after the final sentence has been imposed or while the sentence is being served result in the redefinition or modification of the scope of the “penalty” imposed by the trial court, those measures should fall within the scope of the prohibition of the retroactive application of penalties enshrined in Article 7 § 1 in fine of the Convention (ibid. , § 89). In order to determine whether a measure taken during the execution of a sentence concerns only the manner of execution of the sentence or, on the contrary, also affects its scope, the Court must examine in each case what the “penalty” imposed actually entailed under the domestic law in force at the material time or, in other words, what its intrinsic nature was (ibid. , § 90). For example, the Court considered the application of a new approach to the system of remissions of sentence as having led to the redefinition of the scope of the penalty, inasmuch as the new approach had had the effect of modifying the scope of the penalty imposed to the sentenced person’s disadvantage (ibid. , §§ 109-110 and 117, concerning a thirty-year prison sentence to which, under a case-law reversal, no remissions of sentence for work done in detention would effectively be applied). See also a case where concurrent sentences passed by different trial courts were combined into one overall sentence ( Koprivnikar v. Slovenia, §§ 50-52).

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