Onder 3.59. Rechtbank Amsterdam 12 mei 2021

In order to understand the mechanism by which an agreement to share pre-determined gross list prices results in truck manufacturers independently choosing higher gross list prices, consider the following simple example. Under competition (and in the absence of sharing gross list prices), suppose that the managers of the truck manufacturers expect gross list prices to rise by, say, 5%. They also recognize that higher profits would be earned if they were all to raise gross list prices by, say, 10% - which would raise subsequent prices in the vertical chain of production and pricing by the mechanism set out earlier. Of course, in competition, no individual truck manufacturer has an incentive to do so on its own. The reason is that raising its gross list prices by 10%, when rival truck manufacturers’ gross list prices are only increased by 5%, would result in that truck manufacturer’s end prices in the market being too high relative to the competition, because its higher gross list prices would be passed through to yield higher end prices. Thus, a competing truck manufacturer does not raise its gross list prices by 10% because it is concerned that it will be left at a competitive disadvantage in the expectation that rival truck manufacturers would only raise their gross list prices by 5%.

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