Onder 5.12. Rechtbank Den Haag 20 april 2016

Separate from their context, the ordinary meaning of these words is more indicative of the accuracy of the explanation put forward by the Russian Federation. After all, in the interpretation of the Tribunal – in which the word “if” would be more fitting – the Limitation Clause is limited to one form of irreconcilability with national law, namely a ban on provisional application itself. The Tribunal has specifically acknowledged that the drafters of a treaty or legislative provision often use the term “to the extent” to indicate that a provision can only be applied to the extent to which the subsequent words are complied with. However, considering the context in which this term should be placed, the Tribunal attached decisive importance to the adjective “such”. According to the Tribunal, the words “such provisional application” only refer to the term “this Treaty” mentioned earlier in Article 45 paragraph 1, and it concerns whether or not “such provisional application of this Treaty” is not contrary to national law. The court holds that this notional addition does not provide clarity. This reference to the treaty, which is evident – another interpretation is after all inconceivable – does not provide clarity on the question whether the provisional application can only relate to the Treaty as a whole, and therefore to the provisional application principle, or only parts of the treaty, meaning particular treaty provisions. Special significance can therefore not be attached to the reference to “this Treaty” in the interpretation of the Limitation Clause.

$ curl -s https://bron.page/api/v1/blobs/c41b7b536312fc28d662a84342c9ad14bf27e0adff7968e8433c5063474db641 | shasum -a 256